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Dynamic Optimization and Conformity in Health Behavior and Life Enjoyment over
the Life Cycle
Hernán Bejarano 

Hillard Kaplanᶲ

Stephen Rassenti

Abstract
This article examines individual and social influences on investments in health and enjoyment
from immediate consumption. We report the results of a lab experiment that mimics the
problem of health investment over a lifetime, building on Grossman’s (1972a, 1972b)
theoretical framework. Subjects earn money through the experiment in proportion to the sum
of the life enjoyment they have consumed. However, income in each period is a function of
previous health investments, so there is a dynamic optimum for maximizing earnings through
the appropriate expenditures on life enjoyment and health in each period. In order to model
social effects in the experiment, we randomly assigned individuals to chat/observation groups,
composed of four subjects each. Two treatments were employed: In the Independent treatment,
an individual’s rewards from investments in life enjoyment depend only on his choice and in the
Interdependent treatment, rewards not only depend on an individual’s choices but also on their
similarity to the choices of the others in their group. Seven predictions were tested and each
was supported by the data. We found: 1) Subjects engaged in helpful chat in both treatments;
2) there was significant heterogeneity among both subjects and groups in chat frequencies; and
3) chat was most common early in the experiment. The interdependent treatment 4) increased
strategic chat frequency, 5) decreased within-group variance, 6) increased between-group
variance, and 7) increased the likelihood of behavior far from the optimum with respect to the
dynamic problem. Individual incentives explain a large part, but not all, of the variance in
prosocial behavior in the form of strategic advice. Incentives for conformity appear to promote
prosocial behavior, but also increase variance among groups in equilibrium outcomes, leading
to convergence on suboptimal strategies for some groups.
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1. Introduction
Inequalities in health, across and within populations, are a major public concern
that demand attention (Murray et al. 1999). For example, the life expectancy of Native
American males is 56 years in some counties, while that of Asian American women is 95
years in other counties (Murray et al. 1998). While several critical variables such as income
and education help explain these differences, significant variance remains unexplained
(Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010). Other explanatory variables are related to health
behavior, exercise, and dietary habits. In fact, health behavior explains about 40 percent of
premature mortality, as well as substantial morbidity and disability, in the United States
(McGinnis et al. 2002).
Empirical evidence shows that social groups influence health behavior in complex
ways. Peer pressure can help individuals control health habits (Umberson et al. 2010). For
example, spouses or religious communities may monitor, inhibit, regulate, or facilitate the
health behavior of their partners or members of their community (Waite 1995, Ellison and
Levin 1998). Group effects alternatively might lead individuals to engage in risk-taking and
increased alcohol consumption. In addition, there seem to be matching effects; for example,
having an obese spouse or friend can increase an individual’s likelihood of being obese
(Christakis and Fowler 2007; Crosnoe et al. 2004). Despite the extensive evidence of group
influence in health behavior, little is known of the precise mechanisms by which groups
influence individual choices. Identifying the social causes of behavioral change from
naturally occurring data is difficult due to selection biases and unobserved heterogeneity
associated with group formation (Fowler et al. 2011). In addition, interactions between
individuals and groups that affect health behavior are usually unobserved.

This article examines individual and social influences on investments in health and
enjoyment from immediate consumption. We do this in a specially framed lab experiment
that mimics the problem of health investment over a lifetime, building on Grossman’s
(1972a, 1972b) theoretical framework to study health investment choices. Choosing
optimal health investments over the life course is a complex task. Individuals might
estimate well the current costs and benefits of their actions but be less certain of their longrun effects. In essence, to determine how much time, income and effort to invest in healthy
behavior, individuals have to solve a dynamic programing problem addressing uncertainty
concerning future income and progressive health degeneration.
In the lab, our subjects experienced an experimental environment that mimics the
previously described health-investment problem. Each subject lives a nine-period life,
during each period of which he earns income and then invests some proportion of that
income in health and some in life enjoyment. Subjects earn money through the experiment
in proportion to the sum of the life enjoyment they have consumed. However, income in
each period is a function of previous health investments, so there is a dynamic optimum for
maximizing earnings through the appropriate expenditures on life enjoyment and health in
each period. Subjects live eight lives during the experiment with identical parameter
values, so they can learn from experience.
In order to model social effects in the experiment, we randomly assigned individuals
to chat/observation groups, composed of four subjects each. Between lives, subjects were
allowed to chat with and observe the choices of others in their chat group. We employed
the chat room discussions during the experiments to study how advice and queries about
the appropriate investment strategies affected behavior. Our experimental approach in

which chat/observation groups are formed randomly and in which interactions between
the individuals of the groups are recorded, allow us to analyze whether a mechanism exists
that links health behavior and group communication.
Our experimental design presents two treatments to investigate social impacts on
health. In our baseline Independent treatment, an individual’s rewards from investments
in life enjoyment depend only on his choices. When rewards are independent of others’
choices, individuals do not have monetary incentives to provide any advice. However,
individuals still have an incentive to search for advice, and particularly, might be willing to
post queries about strategies, hoping that those who perform better will voluntarily
provide some guidance. Therefore, in the independent treatment, an individual’s
willingness to provide advice is mostly generated by their intrinsic motivation to help
others.
In the second Interdependent treatment, rewards not only depend on an
individual’s choices but also on their similarity to the choices of the others in their group.
Individuals have a payoff function that provides them incentive to make behavioral choices
similar to the other members of their group (a conformity coefficient). Therefore, in the
interdependent treatment, individuals have an extrinsic motivation to discuss, agree, and
coordinate on health behavior.
In keeping with the theme of this special issue, the goal of this article is to utilize this
experimental design to test a series of hypotheses about social influences on health
behavior. We propose that social effects derive from two principle routes. First, people
utilize observation of behavior and engage in direct communication about practices and
strategies in order to be better able to achieve their goals. Providing advice and educating

others is an intrinsically human and pro-social activity. Humans have been providing
advice regarding health behavior for millennia (Kleinman 1980), and now they can even
provide advice to strangers on the Internet (Constant et al. 1996, Swan 2012). A second
route for social effects derives from the increased utility people gain by the extent to which
their choices conform to those of others, with whom they interact and identify. This second
route may reinforce the optimizing effects of the first route, but may also lead to multiple
equilibria. In other words, communication, queries and advice regarding health behavior,
can improve health investment and life-enjoyment choices, but also can lead to suboptimal
habits. From this logic, we test the following predictions:
1) In both treatments, subjects will make queries and provide strategic advice during
chat.
2) Significant chat heterogeneity will exist between groups, above the individual
heterogeneity of its members, through processes of observation and information
exchange.
3) Advice and queries will be most common during the first few lives of the experiment
while individuals are most focused on learning.
4) Due to incentives, chat about investment behavior will be more frequent in the
interdependent treatment than in the independent treatment.
5) The conformity payoff in the interdependent treatment will decrease within-group
variance in behavior.
6) Due to the possibility of multiple equilibria, the interdependent treatment will
increase among-group variance in behavior.

7) As a result of 5, the worst performing groups, in terms of optimizing investments
per period over the life course, will be more common in the interdependent rewards
treatment.

2. The Health Investment Problem: Theory and Experimental Environment

In the experiments to be reported each individual participant worked in a real effort
harvesting task to earn income and made a sequence of investment decisions in a series of
unrelated lifetimes. Each lifetime was comprised of a sequence of 9 periods (t =1, 2,…9) of
real effort earnings activity followed by investment decision making. Every lifetime ended
after nine periods unless the participant’s ‘health’ had degenerated to the point of death
before then. After each lifetime ended, every participant was ‘reincarnated’ into his next
unrelated lifetime.
Once the participant finished the real effort harvesting task in period t, from which
effort she had secured harvest revenue1, Rt, proportional to current health, she was
required to make investment decisions: how much to invest, It, in preserving health for
future harvesting, how much to invest in life enjoyment, Lt, in order to be paid for her
efforts, and how much (if any) to leave uninvested in a bank account, Bt, that would become
available for future investments in life enjoyment or health. All participants were endowed
with a beginning bank balance, B0, of 0, and should end with a final bank balance, B9, of 0, if

1

For a complete description of the real effort harvesting task, the revenue possible, and the optimal harvesting
strategy see Appendix 1.

they maximize their total gains from life enjoyment. The budget constraints governing
investment in each period were given by:
It + Lt + Bt = Bt-1 + Rt  t=1, 2, …9
The non-linear return functions for investments in health and life enjoyment are
given below. They were designed to have diminishing returns to scale, so that the optimal
investment pattern across time would display properties similar to a Grossman model. The
transition equation in our experimental system relating final health in period t (Ht) to final
health in the previous period (Ht-1), given an investment (It) in preserving health, and a
natural degeneration (dt) of health that occurred during period t, was given by:
𝐻𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 [100, 𝐻𝑡−1 − d𝑡 + 30

1 − ⅇ −.025It
]
1 + ⅇ −.025It

A participant could theoretically regenerate health by up to 30 points in any given
period if she had accumulated an ‘infinite’ amount of harvest revenue to invest, but an
upper bound was imposed that prevented the next state of health from ever exceeding 100.
Furthermore, the parameters in the experimental environment were chosen such that the
boundary condition, Ht+1 = 100, was never approached under optimal or ‘reasonable’
decision making. Given the interior solution was always active, the marginal rate of return
on health investment each period was given by:
𝑑𝐻𝑡
1.5ⅇ −.025It
=
𝑑𝐼𝑡
1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It
Note that at It= 0, dHt/dIt = 3/8 and the rate of return on each subsequent revenue
unit invested in health is independent of initial state of health (Ht) until health reaches 100.
Over many periods and lifetimes, participants could become very familiar with the fixed

function governing diminishing returns on health investment.
The earnings equation relating investment in life enjoyment (Lt) to cash earned (Et)
in period t, by a socially independent participant was given by:

Socially Independent Earnings: 𝐸𝑡 = 250(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028𝐿𝑡 )

By convention, in any given period t, degradation of health occurred after
harvesting. Then health investment, Ht, selected was implemented prior to the life
enjoyment investment, Lt, so that the upgraded state of health would be incorporated into
the life enjoyment computation. The participants were given graphical representations of
the health and life enjoyment investments that made it very clear that both had diminishing
returns.2 The participant’s job was to correctly balance investment of harvesting revenue
between health and life enjoyment, each period of her lifetime. To maximize her earnings
across her entire life (periods 1-9) the participant had to solve the following nonlinear
program:
Maximize:

∑𝑡=1,9 𝐸𝑡 = ∑𝑡=1,9 250(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(1 − ⅇ−.028𝐿𝑡 )

Subject to:

𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐿𝑡
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡−1 − d𝑡 + 30
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑟ⅇ𝑣(Ht/100)

∀ 𝑡 = 1, … 9
1−ⅇ −.025It
1+ⅇ −.025t

∀ 𝑡 = 1, … 93

during any active harvest period4

The second derivatives are calculated in the Appendix 2.
Health degeneration dt= {-16, -17, … -23, -24}
4 Rev is a fixed parameter that indicates participant harvesting proficiency. See Appendix 2 for further
discussion.
2
3

The main treatment variable in the experiments reported determined whether each
subject’s earnings from investing in life enjoyment were interdependent or independent of
the decisions made by other subjects in his social group. The earnings equation for socially
interdependent participants, relating investment in life enjoyment (Lt) to cash earned (Et)
in period t given the mean investment, Ot, made by all other subjects in the subject’s social
group, is given by:
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐿 ,𝑂 )

Socially Interdependent Earnings: 𝐸𝑡 = 1.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐿𝑡 ,𝑂𝑡 ) ∗ 250(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028𝐿𝑡 )
𝑡

𝑡

Note, these earnings were simply computed as the Socially Independent Earnings
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐿 ,𝑂 )

𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐿 ,𝑂 )

multiplied by a ‘conformity multiplier,’ 1.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐿𝑡 ,𝑂𝑡 ) . The ratio 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐿𝑡 ,𝑂𝑡 ) measures the
𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

proportion by which the subject’s life enjoyment investment, Lt, matches the mean life
enjoyment investment, Ot, of other members of her social group. Under interdependence, a
subject who conforms to the group mean in making her life investment choices could earn a
premium of up to 50%, while one that strayed from her group’s mean (more than 33%
below or above) would find herself earning less than she would if she were not socially
bound.
The Health graph below indicates that starting from her current health of 50, the
participant could possibly increase her next period’s health up to level 80 by making a large
health investment. Meanwhile, the Enjoyment graph below shows two lines: the dashed
line represents enjoyment earnings under social Independence, while the solid line
represents enjoyment earnings under social Interdependence when other members of the
subject’s group make a mean investment of 60. In experiments where subjects are

Independent they only see the dashed line. In experiments where subjects are
Interdependent they see both lines and can adjust the location of the apex of the solid line
according to their premonition concerning their group’s mean investment. The enjoyment
graph shows that under Independence a subject who invests 60 in life enjoyment would
receive a payoff of ~333, which would be translated to a cash reward at experiment’s end.
Under Interdependence if the group mean were 60 and the subject made the same
investment, she would earn 500 = 1.5 x 333, while if she chose to invest 40 or 130 she
would only earn ~3005.

In our environments, the shape of the Health investment graph would never alter:
only the starting point on the Y-axis, current health, would adjust from period to period.
However the shape of the Enjoyment Investment graph would get steeper if health
deteriorated or flatten if health improved.
Note that in the constrained dynamic maximization problem the subject must solve, Ht can
be rewritten as a function of her initial health, H0, and investments, It, in health.

5

In order to make investments, the participant used reciprocating scroll bars on the x-axis of each graph that would
not allow her to spend more than the revenue she had accumulated.

1 − ⅇ −.025Ik
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻0 + ∑
−𝑑𝑘 + 30
1 + ⅇ −.025Ik
𝑘=1,𝑡

So solving the participant’s constrained life enjoyment optimization can be
rewritten as an unconstrained optimization that is a function of the sequence of health
investments Ii and bank deposits Bt6:

∑ 𝐸𝑡 = ∑ 250(1 + [𝐻0 + ∑
𝑡=1,9

𝑡=1,9

𝑘=1,𝑡

−𝑑𝑘 + 30

1 − ⅇ −.025Ik
] /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028(𝐵𝑡−1 +𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡) )
1 + ⅇ −.025Ik

This problem is easy to solve numerically for any given period t when Ht-1, Bt-1, Rt
and Bt are known.7 The initial conditions for health and bank balance were given by H0 = 85
and B0 = 0, the final bank balance B9 must be zero, and Rt is always a linear function, rev(Ht1/100),

of previous period’s health. We can either apply non-linear optimization or

dynamic programming techniques to find the optimal sequence of health investments, It,
and the corresponding maximal aggregate life enjoyment ∑𝑖=1,9 𝐸𝑡 .
It is important to note that under Interdependence, even with its premium for investment
conformity and penalty for non-conformity, the optimal investment pattern for like-skilled
harvesters is exactly the same as it is under Independence. The best that any group can do

The parameters in the environments we designed were such that the optimal Bt* was rarely anything other
than 0. This considerably reduced the dimension of the decision making problem faced by participants. On
rare occasions, during the move from harvesting to retirement (periods 6 to 7), there was a minor
improvement in overall life enjoyment by banking some harvest income to smooth investment in life
enjoyment.
7 Appendix 2 provides the example of period 9.
6

is for all individuals to conform to what would otherwise be the optimal investment pattern
for each under Independence: resulting earnings would simply be multiplied by 1.5.
Using Rt = 87(Ht-1/100) (we found that 87 was the low variance, mean skill parameter of all
participants), the period by period optimal Health (Ht) profile that participants should
maintain in order to make health investments (It) that maximize total life enjoyment (Et)
is given in the following table:

Optimal Health (Ht) by period:
1
2
3
4
89
91
92
90

5
86

6
78

7
65

8
42

9
18

The table below captures a quantitative representation of what is necessary to
maintain this optimal health vector, and hints at some behavioral difficulties participants
might encounter if their perception of optimal strategy requirements is less than perfect. It
shows the marginal rates of return for optimal investments in life enjoyment in each period
of life, and implicitly the rate of return on investment in health and banking for current and
future enjoyment maximization.8 It also shows the percentage of income earned (plus
banked9) that must be devoted to optimal health maintenance in each period of life.

Optimal Marginal Rate of Return, % of Income Invested in Health, by period:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10.0, 86 8.6, 80
7.4, 73
6.3, 67
5.3, 59
4.3, 50
3.3, 35
2.5, 0

9
2.5, 0

This is true for all periods except where a boundary condition is met (only in periods 8 and/or 9) and the
marginal return on any investment in health is dominated by investment in life enjoyment (L t) so the optimal
investment in health is zero (It=0).
9 There are only 2 periods in the 36 displayed where it behooves subjects to bank some earned revenue for
the purpose income smoothing: in period 8 of the Flat No Retirement regime where health will fall
precipitously in period 9, and in period 6 of the Tiered Retirement regime where income falls precipitously in
period 7, the first period of retirement.
8

Savvy participants must recognize that 86% of earned revenue from harvesting
must be spent on health in period 1, and 80% in period 2, while the marginal rates of
return on investments are 4 times larger than later in life: that skewed optimal investment
strategy is a requirement to be reckoned with in splitting earned harvest revenues between
health and life enjoyment. Late in life (periods 8 and 9), participants must let go of their
health and spend entirely on life enjoyment. The complete solution for all decision and
state variables are provided in Appendix I.

Multiple Lives and Chat Groups

This nine period dynamic optimization problem is difficult to solve, due to the
nonlinearities and interactions in the health and life enjoyment functions. In order to allow
subjects to learn about the environment and to adjust their strategies accordingly, subjects
lived eight nine-period lives under identical conditions. This ‘reincarnation’ can be thought
of as a way of modeling cultural traditions in which individuals learn from previous
generations how to best perform in the environment. In addition, we proposed that in
response to difficult dynamic problems, people would use observational learning and
information exchange to help solve those problems. To model that process, subjects were
divided in four-person chat-observation groups. Subjects could observe the behavior of
three other subjects (the same three people in each life) and could chat with them, using
text messages, between lives.

Under Social Independence the chat group provided nothing more than a venue to
exchange information concerning individual strategy, but under Social Interdependence,
the mean investment in Life Enjoyment by other members of a chat group became the
norm by which investment of each group member was evaluated and translated into
earnings. Interdependence allowed conformity in investment strategies to enhance
earnings and non-conformity to penalize them. Under Interdependence, chat provided a
venue for both optimizing and conforming strategies to evolve.
A total of 156 subjects, who were randomly allocated to 39 chat/observation
groups, 68 subjects (17 chat groups) in the Independent treatment, 88 subjects (22 chat
groups) in the Interdependent treatment. Members of each chat-group were free to
observe and discuss (or not) each other’s performances for 90 seconds at the end of each
lifetime.
Subjects’ conversations were captured by the messages written in chat window.
Chat lines were classified independently by two independent research assistants that acted
as coders10. Coders were trained to apply a classification criterion that captures the
presence of strategic advice and queries.
To achieve this goal, coders classified lines into one of four thematic categories and
into one of two linguistic categories. The thematic categories captured message’s meaning,
while the linguistic category captured the message’s direction and intention. The four
thematic categories were: Income Generation, Income Allocation, Other Experimental
Issues, Non-Experimental chat. In this article we focus on the second category: this

The chat lines of the Independent treatment were classified by four coders. To be consistent with the
classification of chat lines in the Interdependent treatment, we used for this paper a classification based on
hose codifiers with similar interelaiability rates to the codifiers of the Interdependent treatment.
10

category includes all those messages in which subjects expressed ideas or concerns
regarding the allocation of their income to health and life enjoyment. The two linguistic
categories were: Statements or Queries. Chat lines were assigned to particular class only if
both coders agreed on their classification.

3. Statistical Approach

In order to handle the repeated and clustered nature of the experimental design, we
employed a mixed fixed and random effects linear model to analyze the data. Each subject
lived eight lifetimes, having the opportunity to chat with others in her chat/observation
group seven times. During the experiment, each subject chose 72 times (8 lives x 9 periods)
how to allocate her income between health and life enjoyment investments. The empirical
model takes into account the lack of independence among observations within and among
individuals in groups. To do this, the model estimates the fixed effects of lifetime,
experimental treatment, and interaction terms, while assessing the random effects for chat
group and individual.

4. Results
Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for the main variables to be analyzed are presented in Table 1.
For each of the eight ‘lives’ in the experiment, the table shows the means for total
enjoyment purchased and the number of strategic queries and advice made per subject

during the rest phase following that life during which chat was allowed. Total enjoyment
purchased is the sum of the amount purchased in each of the nine periods and is
proportional to the actual amount the subject is paid. Those data are presented in three
columns. The first column shows the means for the treatment group in which each subject’s
rewards from investments in life enjoyment are independent (that is, the rewards are
unaffected by the behavior of other subjects in the chat group). There are two columns for
the other treatment group in which rewards are interdependent. The first of those columns
(column 2) presents the counterfactual independent rewards (for comparability purposes)
that the subjects in the interdependent chat groups would have received if their rewards
were independent. The second of those columns (column 3) presents the rewards they
actually received from their investments, after their interdependence is taken into account
through the conformity multiplier. It is evident from the table that for both treatment
groups, Total Enjoyment Purchased increases with each life, indicating that their
performance increasingly approached the optimal investment profile across lives. It is also
evident that subjects in the interdependent rewards treatment group achieved increasingly
high levels of conformity across lives to maximize the multiplier on their investments. The
regression models discussed below will examine these effects in detail.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Total Enjoyment Purchased

Life
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Independent
940
1244
1400
1587
1645
1679
1759
1764

Interdependent
w/o Conformity
1050
1303
1436
1543
1557
1645
1633
1705

Strategic Queries
Interdep
endent
with
conformi
ty
1026
1567
1830
2052
2138
2293
2303
2427

Independent
0.6
0.9
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1

Inter
depe
nden
t
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.8
1.7
1.3
1.0

Strategic Advice

Independe
nt
2.8
2.1
1.9
1.9
1.4
1.4
1.0
n/a

Interdepende
nt
8.1
11.4
8.4
7.8
6.6
5.5
5.5

The last four columns of Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics derived from the
coding of the chat that occurred during rest phases between lives. In contrast to earnings
which increase over the course of the experiment, chat queries and advice about strategy
are more frequent following the first few lives, and then decrease. Interestingly, advice is
about four times more common than queries. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of mixed
effect regression model, with fixed effects for the experimental variables and random
effects for individual and chat/observation group variables as explanatory variables of
strategic queries and advice, respectively. In both tables, Model I regresses life,
experimental treatment (Independent vs Interdependent rewards), and their interaction
on strategic chat, while controlling for the random effects of individual subject and
chat/observation group. There are strong effects of life and treatment on both queries and
advice, and some of the interaction terms are significant as well. The interdependent
groups both made more queries and gave more advice than those with independent

rewards, as would be expected by the gains from coordination and conformity. Relative to
the last lives, strategic chat of both types was greatest early in the experiment when
learning and behavior change was greatest.
Table 2 Predictors of Strategic Queries
Model 1

Model 2

Parameter
Intercept

df
Estimate Sig.
Estimate Sig.
274
.26
0.000
.22
0.014

Life 1†
Life 2
Life 3
Life 4
Life 5
Life 6

924
924
924
924
924
924

.41
.36
.31
.43
.16
.07

0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.097
0.477

.41
.36
.31
.43
.16
.07

0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.097
0.477

Independent Rewards‡

274

-.25

0.036

-.25

0.036

Life 1 * Ind. Rewards~
Life 2 * Ind. Rewards
Life 3 * Ind. Rewards
Life 4 * Ind. Rewards
Life 5 * Ind. Rewards
Life 6 * Ind. Rewards
Within Group Rank
Covariance Parameters / Random
Effects
Residual
Chat/obs. Group

924
924
924
924
924
924

-.26
-.16
-.23
-.4
-.1
.01

0.071
0.277
0.108
0.006
0.490
0.971

-.26
-.16
-.23
-.4
-.1
.01
.02

0.071
0.277
0.108
0.006
0.490
0.971
0.406

Subject

Estimate Sig.
Estimate Sig.
.4
0.000
.4
0.000
.02
0.101
.02
0.104
.05

0.000

.05

0.000

†Life

parameters are measure against baseline of
Life 7.
‡Interdependent
~Interaction

rewards are measured against socially interdependent rewards.

terms are measured against baselines of socially interdependent rewards and life 7.

These effects can be seen clearly in Figures 1a and 1b, which plot the expected
marginal means derived from the Model 1 regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3,
respectively. On average, queries are about five times more frequent and advice is about 4

times more common in the interdependent than independent rewards treatment. This is to
be expected, given that advice and queries that increase conformity of investment in life
enjoyment have direct monetary payoffs for those in the interdependent rewards
treatment. However, it is also interesting to note that in both treatments, advice is about
four times more common than are queries. This is particularly interesting in the case of the
independent rewards treatment, because subjects do not get any direct monetary benefits
from giving advice.

Strategy Advice

0.8

3

0.7

2.5

Chat Messages

Chat Messages

Strategy Queries
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

2
1.5
1

0.2

0.5

0.1

0
1

0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

Life

Life
Independent Rewards
Intdependent

Interdependent

Figure 1a: Model 1, Queries

Interdependent Rewards

Figure 1b: Model 1, Advice

In both tables, Model 2 adds one additional variable to the base Model 1, withingroup earnings rank. This variable, with levels one to four, ranks each of the four members
of the chat/observation group in terms of how much they earned in the life previous to that
chat session (with one being the highest, and four being the lowest earner). This variable
was added to determine whether higher earners were more likely to give advice and lower
earners more like to make queries asking for advice. The results show that high earners are

more likely to give advice, with advice statements decreasing by about .24 with each
successive rank. However, rank did not have a significant effect on queries. It would appear
that subjects that did well relative to others whom they could observe and engage in chat
were more motivated to offer advice, but asking for advice, which was less common, did
not depend on rank.

Table3: Predictors of Strategic Statements
Model 1
Parameter
Intercept
Life 1†
Life 2
Life 3
Life 4
Life 5
Life 6
Independent Rewards‡
Life 1 * Ind. Rewards~
Life 2 * Ind. Rewards
Life 3 * Ind. Rewards
Life 4 * Ind. Rewards
Life 5 * Ind. Rewards
Life 6 * Ind. Rewards
Within Group Rank
Covariance Parameters / Random
Effects
Residual
Chat/obs. Group
Subject
†Life

Model 2

df
Estimate Sig.
Estimate Sig.
76
1.38 0.000
1.98 0.000
924
0.65 0.008
0.65 0.008
924
1.48 0.000
1.48 0.000
924
0.72 0.004
0.72 0.003
924
0.58 0.018
0.58 0.018
924
0.28 0.247
0.28 0.244
924
0.00 1.000
0.00 1.000
-1.13 0.013
-1.13 0.013
274
924
924
924
924
924
924

-0.21
-1.20
-0.50
-0.36
-0.18
0.10

Estimate
2.64
1.03
0.71

0.578
0.001
0.182
0.334
0.626
0.782

-0.21
-1.20
-0.50
-0.36
-0.18
0.10
-0.24

0.576
0.001
0.180
0.331
0.624
0.780
0.000

Sig.
Estimate Sig.
0.000
2.62 0.000
0.001
1.06 0.001
0.000
0.60 0.000

parameters are measure against baseline of

Life7
‡Interdependent
~Interaction

rewards are measured against socially interdependent rewards

terms are measured against baselines of socially interdependent rewards and life 7.

The last set of rows in Tables 2 and 3 present the random effects, the residual
unaccounted for variance and the effects due to individual subject and chat group. In the
case of queries, there were significant random effects in subject’s play, but the effects of
chat group were not significant. In the case of strategic advice, both individual and chat
group random effects were significant, and in fact, the random effects estimate for chat
group were slightly greater than for subject.
Together, these results support predictions 1-4 above: Subjects engaged in helpful
chat in both treatments; there was significant heterogeneity among both subjects and
groups in chat frequencies; chat was most common early in the experiment; and chat was
more frequent in the interdependent treatment.

Predictors of Enjoyment Earnings and Assessment of Social Effects

Due to the dramatic differences in chat by treatment and the expectation that the
variance within and among chat groups would differ between the two treatments, we
analyze the Enjoyment Earnings for the two treatment groups, separately. Tables 4 and 5
present the results of the mixed fixed and random effects regression models for the
independent and interdependent rewards treatments, respectively. In Table 4, Model 1
presents the baseline model in which Enjoyment Earnings are regressed on life alone, while
Model 2 adds an additional variable, Total Strategic Chat, to the base model. Total Strategic
Chat is the sum of both queries and advice statements over all four members of the group

following a given life. This variable was added as an attempt to examine whether verbal
exchanges over strategy improved earnings in the next life.

For the independent rewards treatment, we can see from the base Model 1 that
earnings increase by almost 90% during the course of the experiment from 940 in life 1 to
1764 in life 8. Model 2 shows that Total Strategic Chat did not have a significant effect on
earnings. However, the random effects terms do show appreciable group level random
effects, suggesting that observing other group members’ play and/or the chat did have
effects on behavior. Nevertheless, the estimates for random effects at subject’s level were a
little more than three times as high as for chat groups (35,053 vs. 10,818), as expected for
the independent treatment.

Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the regression models for
interdependent treatment, both for the counterfactual earnings without the conformity
multiplier and the actual earnings, taken into account the conformity effect. From the
Model 1 analysis, we see that earnings also increase from life to life, starting from a mean of
1050 in life 1 and ending with mean of 1704 in life 8 without the conformity multiplier, and
from 1026 to 2427 with the multiplier. Adding Total Strategic Chat in Model 2, we see that
it has no significant effect on earnings without the multiplier, but a large effect with the
multiplier. Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that we cannot detect an
effect of chat on solving the dynamic problem of optimizing investments over the nineperiod life course, but we can detect an effect of chat on improving earnings through the
conformity multiplier. In other words, subjects were able to coordinate their strategies and

make similar investments in each period; the chat appears to have facilitated this
coordination.

Table 4 Enjoyment Earnings without Socially Dependent Rewards
Parameter
Intercept
Life 1
Life 2
Life 3
Life 4
Life 5
Life 6
Life 7
theme2_sum
Covariance Parameters /
Random Effects
Residual
Chat/obs. Group
Subject

df
39
469
469
469
469
469
469
469

Model 1
Estimate
1764
-824
-520
-364
-176
-119
-85
-5

Model 2
Sig.
df
Estimate Sig.
0.000
36
1761
0.000
0.000
0.000
407
-526
0.000
0.000
405
-369
0.000
0.000
403
-179
0.000
0.004
402
-122
0.003
0.037
402
-86
0.031
0.896
402
-7
0.860
397
2
0.638

Estimate
56204
35053
10817

Sig.
0.000
0.000
0.167

Estimate Sig.
53691
0.000
41606
0.000
11095
0.199

Table 5 Enjoyment Earnings with Socially Dependent Rewards
Model I

Parameter
Intercept
Life 1
Life 2
Life 3
Life 4
Life 5
Life 6
Life 7
theme2_sum
Covariance
Parameters /
Random
Effects
Residual
Chat/obs.
Group
Subject

df
39
469
469
469
469
469
469
469

Interdependent
w/o conformity
Estimate
Sig.
1705 0.000
-655 0.000
-402 0.000
-269 0.000
-162 0.000
-148 0.000
-60 0.080
-72 0.036

Model 2
Interdependent
with conformity
Est.
Sig.
2427
0.000
-1401
0.000
-860
0.000
-597
0.000
-375
0.000
-289
0.000
-134
0.006
-124
0.011

df
36
407
405
403
402
402
402
397

Interdependent
w/o conformity
Est.
Sig.
1698 0.000

Interdependent
with conformity
Est.
Sig.
2390 0.000

-406
-276
-166
-152
-62
-72
1

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.055
0.025
0.473

-882
-639
-399
-310
-143
-124
5

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.007
0.005

Est.
51678

Sig.
0.000

Est.
102943

Sig.
0.000

Est.
45205

Sig.
0.000

Est.
92560

Sig.
0.000

11533

0.000

10179

0.013

13567

0.000

14248

0.003

42449

0.003

133297

0.002

51138

0.003

157171

0.002

Figure 2 illustrates these effects by plotting the expected marginal means for
enjoyment earnings from the Model 1 regressions in Tables 4 and 5. Earnings for both
treatments increase with each progressive life, and are very similar on average for the two
treatments, when the conformity bias is not taken into account. However, the
interdependent chat groups also increasingly took advantage of the conformity multiplier
(as can be seen by the increasing distance between the red and orange lines).
The dramatic effects of introducing interdependence in rewards can be seen from the
variance decomposition of the random effects. As opposed to the independent rewards
case where the chat group random effects were one third as large as the individual subject

random effects, they were 13 times larger (133,297 vs 10,179) in the case of actual
enjoyment earnings in the interdependent case. The ratios of the within and between group
variances reverse moving from independent to interdependent rewards. The differences
between the two treatments were highly significant (p < .0001), for both within-group
variance (higher in the independent rewards treatment) and between-group variance
(higher in the interdependent treatment).
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Figure 2: Enjoyment Earnings Marginal Means

Finally, to ask whether the conformity effect might lead some groups to converge on
suboptimal strategies, we examined the likelihood of being in the bottom quartile of
earnings at the level of the chat group. To make the data comparable, we used the total
enjoyment purchased for the groups in each treatment, ignoring the conformity multiplier.

Those results are presented in Table 6, using data from lives 7 and 8 when earnings in both
treatments were highest.

Table 6 Cumulative Earnings in the Lowest Quartile
Lowest Quartile
Enjoyment Earnings
No
Yes
Total

Treatment Group
Independent Interdependent
30
29
4
15
34

44

Total
59
19
78

Table 6 shows that just over a third of the chat groups in the interdependent
rewards treatment were in the lowest quartile of mean earnings (15/44), whereas only
11% were in the lowest quartile in the independent treatment, leading to an odds ratio of
about 3. These results suggest that the focus on social conformity in investment in life
enjoyment can increase variance among groups, with some groups stabilizing at behavioral
strategies quite far from optimal dynamic performance.
Together, these results support predictions 5-7 with the interdependent treatment
decreasing within-group variance but increasing between-group variance, sometimes
resulting in behavior far from the optimum with respect to the dynamic problem.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

There are two large scale implications of these findings. First, in keeping with the
theme of this special issue, individual incentives explain a large part, but not all, of the
variance in prosocial behavior in the form of strategic advice. Second, incentives for

conformity promote prosocial behavior, but also increase variance among groups in
equilibrium outcomes, leading to convergence on suboptimal strategies for some groups.
We discuss each in turn.
The independent rewards treatment provides insights into ‘non-selfish’ prosocial
behavior. In that case, there were no monetary incentives for subjects to help others find
the optimal strategy of investments, but there were also no monetary incentives to defect
or mislead them. Nor were subjects given instructions about what they could talk about
between lives. Nevertheless, about one third of chat messages were about strategies of how
to perform in the experiment, two thirds of which were directed to optimal investment
(about 2 messages per life). Moreover, most messages were advice rather than queries
about strategy. Individual monetary incentives might explain queries, but are less likely to
explain advice. In addition, subjects who did relatively better than other in their group in
terms of earnings were more likely to provide strategic advice, but were no more likely to
make queries. This suggests that better earners were motivated to help those who did
worse.
We were unable to show that in the independent rewards treatment, quantity of
strategy messages was associated with earnings. There are several possible explanations of
this finding. One is that quantity of messages without reference to quality is a poor measure
of information flow. This explanation would be consistent with the finding that there were
significant random effects of chat groups on earnings, and on both health investments and
enjoyment investments. Another possible explanation is that the dynamic optimization
problem subjects faced was particularly complex and nonlinear. They showed through

their behavior that they were able to improve their performance over time, but it may have
been difficult to put those improvements into words in simple chat messages.
The interdependent rewards treatment provided strong monetary incentives for
subjects to coordinate on behavior. These motivations resulted in both absolutely more
strategy chat and a greater relative emphasis on strategy than on other topics. People in the
interdependent group sent about four times as many strategy messages as the independent
rewards group, but they sent fewer messages about topics outside the experiment (1.2
versus 3 messages on average per life per chat group). Just as in the independent
treatment, higher earners (relative to other chat group members) in the socially dependent
treatment offered more strategic advice than lower earners, and advice was much more
common than queries.
With respect to the impacts of chat on earnings, we found mixed results for the
interdependent treatment. As in the case of the independent rewards, we found no
significant effects of chat on earnings without taking into account the conformity
multiplier. However, actual earnings, taking into account the multiplier, were positively
associated with the number of strategy chat messages sent in a life. One interpretation of
this finding is that the chat served more to facilitate conformity on one strategy, rather than
to optimize investments over the life course. Figure 3 examines this possibility by
comparing observed investment behavior with optimal investment behavior. A visual
inspection of the figure suggests that subjects in the independent rewards treatment
converged more on the optimal strategy on average than those in the interdependent
treatment. Unlike the theoretical optimum, investments in life enjoyment in the
interdependent treatment tend to remain flat rather than increase throughout life, and

investments in health decrease much less than is optimal. This suggests that subjects may
have converged on rules of thumb that were easily transmissible. Also, in support of this
interpretation that conformity can conflict with optimizing are (1) the increasing
divergence of the actual earnings from earnings without the multiplier in Figure 2; and (2)
the increased likelihood of being in the bottom quartile of earnings for subjects in the
socially interdependent treatment, when the conformity bias is not taken into account.
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Figure 3. Observed and Theoretically Optimal Investment strategies.
This last finding, when coupled with the massively greater random effects at the
chat group level for the socially interdependent treatment than for the independent
rewards treatment, may imply that conformity biases can compete with other strategic
problems individuals face. In the face of uncertainty, doing what most others do (positive
frequency dependent modeling) can often be the best strategy, since it integrates
information across individuals and over time (Boyd and Richersen 1988). Moreover,

activities that provide enjoyment utility at a potential cost to health, such as smoking,
alcohol consumption, and excessive eating, are often done in social contexts. Thus, the
variant individual who chooses to avoid those activities and invest in health will forego
opportunities for social exchange at the same time.
This tension between gains from conformity and individual optimization may help
explain the striking variability in health behavior across regions, ethnic groups and
socioeconomic strata. The social costs and benefits of cigarette smoking, alcohol
consumption, physical exercise, and eating patterns are likely to vary with respect to their
frequency in the networks in which individuals are embedded. From a social perspective,
overweight or over-exercise, for that matter, may be relative terms.
The processes generating varying social equilibria in health behavior and status
merit further investigation. Behavioral economic experiments that focus on the interplay
of dynamic optimization problems and social forces are likely to provide new insights into
why so many different equilibria are observed, and may be particularly productive in
explaining changing patterns of health.
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Appendix 1: Real Effort Harvesting

During the first part of each period in each life, participants were required to undertake a
real-effort harvesting task in which the participant could earn revenue, Rt, that she could
subsequently invest in either life enjoyment (a cash reward) or health preservation for
subsequent periods of the current lifetime. The amount of time allowed for the harvesting
task during each period (maximum 30 seconds) was directly proportional to the
participant’s current level of health, Ht, (between 0 and 100), so investment in upgrading
health enabled a higher levels of harvesting in future periods. The initial health condition,
85, and the natural degeneration of health across all periods of life {-16, -17, … -23, -24}
were preprogrammed and identical for all participants in all lifetimes in all experimental
treatments. The health degeneration occurred after harvesting just before investment for
the current period began. Never investing in health would result in the participant dying
(not being able to continue to harvesting and investing) in period 5.
The harvesting task assigned to participants required vigilance and some manual dexterity
but was designed so that most participants could perform at a high enough level that their
harvest earnings and optimal investment strategies would be quite comparable. The task
involved a sequence of 30 targets that would skirt across a circular harvesting field. Each
target had a one of four different harvest values, and each target took two seconds to skirt
across the field, after which it disappeared. To harvest the target the participant simply
needed to click on the harvesting field while that target was viable. Once a click was made it
would take 2 seconds to process the harvested target during which time the participant
could harvest no other targets although she could see the unavailable targets as they
skirted by. If the participant’s current health were at level Ht [0,100], then during the first

30x(100- Ht)/100 seconds of the harvest period she would see targets go by that she was
unable to harvest due to her deteriorated health. Similarly, if a target were only partially
processed by the end of the previous period, processing would complete at the beginning of
the next period adding a small increment to any downtime due to deteriorated health.
The table below shows the target values available for harvest during each period of each
life, and the probabilities that each target would be the next to arrive. The optimal
harvesting strategy was simply to harvest either the three most valuable targets whenever
one became available and always ignore lower valued targets. If the participant
implemented the optimal harvesting policy during any particular harvesting period t, and
had a current health level of Ht, then Rt* was her expected optimal harvesting revenue.
Period Target Vector
{13*, 10*, 8*, 6}

Target Probabilities
{.22, .29, .31, .18}

Expected Income
Rt* = 94 (Ht/100)

For any given 30 second period the actual harvest revenue can vary slightly about Rt* even
if the optimal harvesting policy is applied, depending upon the random arrival sequence of
the various targets. Furthermore, the skill level (hand eye coordination and required
vigilance) of any participant in applying the optimal harvesting policy can reduce the
expectation of revenue from harvesting. A perfectly skilled harvester who has a particular
proportion, Ht/100, of harvesting time available in a given harvesting period because of his
current health, collects expected revenues rev (Ht/100) where rev = 94. Because the
revenues collected from harvesting become income available to invest in health and life
enjoyment, lesser harvesting skill, rev < 94, can have a significant effect on the optimal
investment plans for participants of varying skill.

To compute the optimal harvesting strategy, consider, for example, the target set V= {13,
10, 8, 6} where the probability of encountering each target type during the next second is
given by p={.22, .29, .31, .18}. Given it takes 2 seconds of handling time to process any
target, the harvest value per second for each type of target is given by V/2 = {6.5, 5, 4, 3}.
The total value per second derived by harvesting only the n most valuable targets is given
by vipi = {2.86, 5.76, 8.24, 9.32}. The total handling time for the n most valuable targets is
given by 1+ 2pi = {1.44, 2.02, 2.64, 3}. And finally, the total value per second of total
handling time is given by vipi / (1+ 2pi) = {1.99, 2.85, 3.12, 3.1}. The optimal harvesting
policy is to always take whichever of the first three targets shows up next. In a 30 second
harvesting period this policy would generate a total harvest value of 30 x 3.12 = 94 units of
value.
The parameters in the experiment are set such that rev= 94 is the expected revenue per
period for a perfectly skilled harvester who is 100% healthy. In the experiments reported,
the participants displayed mean harvesting skills that were less than perfect (rev= 87), but
with low variance. Because the revenues Rt collected from harvesting become the income
available to invest in health and life enjoyment, lesser harvesting skill can have a significant
effect on the optimal investment schedule. We use rev= 87, the mean harvesting skill of all
subjects, as the baseline parameter for computing optimal investment planning
throughout this paper.

Appendix 2: Computation

The transition equation relating health at the end of period t to health at the end of period t-1 is
given by:
𝐻𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 [100, 𝐻𝑡−1 − d𝑡 + 30

1 − ⅇ −.025It
]
1 + ⅇ −.025It

The first derivative of health w.r.t. investment in health is given by:

𝑑𝐻𝑡
1
(1 − ⅇ −.025It )
= 30 ∙ .025ⅇ −.025It [
+
]
𝑑𝐼𝑡
1 + ⅇ −.025It (1 + ⅇ −.025It )2
or,
𝑑𝐻𝑡
1.5ⅇ −.025It
=
𝑑𝐼𝑡
1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It

The second derivative of health w.r.t. investment in health is given by:
𝑑2 𝐻𝑡
𝑑𝐼𝑡 2

−.025ⅇ −.025It
. 05(ⅇ −.025It )(ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It )
= 1.5 [
+
]
1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It
(1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It )2

or,
𝑑2 𝐻𝑡
𝑑𝐼𝑡 2

= 1.5 [

−.025ⅇ −.025It − .05ⅇ −.05It − .025ⅇ −.075It
. 05(ⅇ −.05It + ⅇ −.075It )
+
]
(1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It )2
(1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It )2
𝑑2 𝐻𝑡
𝑑𝐼𝑡 2

ⅇ −.025It − ⅇ −.075It
= −.025 [
]
(1 + 2ⅇ −.025It + ⅇ −.05It )2

The consumption function which gives subject earnings, Et, from life enjoyment in period t as a
function of the portion of harvest and retirement returns that are invested in life enjoyment, Lt, is
given by:
𝐸𝑡 = 250(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028𝐿𝑡 )

The first derivative of life enjoyment w.r.t. investment in life enjoyment is given by:

𝑑𝐸𝑡
= 7(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(ⅇ −.028𝐿𝑡 )
𝑑𝐿𝑡
The second derivative of life enjoyment w.r.t. investment in life enjoyment is given by:
𝑑2 𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝐿𝑡 2

= −.196(1 + 𝐻𝑡 /100)(ⅇ −.028𝐿𝑡 )

The final period (9) life enjoyment optimization problem is given by: (note that E9 is a function of
the final period investment decisions, I9 and L9, and several pre-determined parameters, B8 (what’s
remaining in the bank after the previous period 8) and R9 (returns from harvesting or retirement in
current period 9) and d9 (degeneration of health (=24) that occurs in current period 9 before
investing)

Maximize:

𝐸9 = 250(1 + 𝐻9 /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028𝐿9 )

Subject to:

𝐵8 + 𝑅9 = 𝐼9 + 𝐿9
1−ⅇ −.025I9

𝐻9 = 𝐻8 − d9 + 30 1+ⅇ −.025I9
Which is equivalent to maximizing the unconstrained function of I9:

𝐸9 = 250(1 + (𝐻8 − d9 + 30

1 − ⅇ −.025I9
) /100)(1 − ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )
1 + ⅇ −.025I9

Taking the first order condition with respect to final health investment, I9, and setting equal to 0 we
get:
𝑑𝐸9
1 − ⅇ −.025I9
. 025ⅇ −.025I9
−.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 )
= 0 = 250(100 + 𝐻8 − d9 + 30
)
/100)(−.028ⅇ
+
75(
𝑑𝐼9
1 + ⅇ −.025I9
1 + ⅇ −.025I9
+

. 025ⅇ −.025I9 (1 − ⅇ −.025I9 )
) (1 − ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )
(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 )2

𝑑𝐸9
1 − ⅇ −.025I9
= 0 = 2.5(100 + 𝐻8 − d9 + 30
)(−.028ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )
𝑑𝐼9
1 + ⅇ −.025I9
. 025ⅇ −.025I9 + .025ⅇ −.05I9 . 025ⅇ −.025I9 −. 025ⅇ −.05I9 )
+ 75(
+
) (1
(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 )2
(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 )2
− ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )

𝑑𝐸9
1 − ⅇ −.025I9
. 025ⅇ −.025I9
−.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 )
= 0 = 2.5(100 + 𝐻8 − d9 + 30
)(−.028ⅇ
)
+
150
(1
𝑑𝐼9
1 + ⅇ −.025I9
(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 )2
− ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )

Letting d9 = 24, we get:

0 = (190 + 2.5𝐻8 + 75

1 − ⅇ −.025I9
3.75ⅇ −.025I9
−.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 )
)(−.028ⅇ
)
+
(1
1 + ⅇ −.025I9
(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 )2

− ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )

2

0 = (190 + 2.5𝐻8 )(1 + ⅇ −.025I9 ) − 2.1(ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9 −𝐼9 ) )(1 − ⅇ −.05I9 ) + 3.75ⅇ −.025I9 (1
− ⅇ −.028(𝐵8 +𝑅9−𝐼9 ) )
The result is a single variable equation in I9 that is soluble by a simple univariate search procedure
given the state of the participant (B8, H8, R9) before her optimal investment decision I9* is made. R9,
harvest revenue is simply a linear function of health in previous periods, either revcH8 or
revc(H1+H2+H3+H4+H5+H6)/6 where revc is a constant dependent on the target set available. Clearly,
L9* = B8 + R9 - I9*

The following tables provide the complete optimal decision trajectory for decision makers who are
perfect harvesters (rev= 94, given the experiment parameters), and the optimal decision trajectory
for decision makers who possess the average harvesting skill (rev= 87) that was demonstrated by
our experimental subjects.

Harvest Rate Per
Health = 0.94

Independent
Period
Investment
Health

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

85

69

72.7

75.1

75.9

74.7

71.1

64.3

52.8

33.6

End Health

85

89.7

93.1

94.9

94.7

92.1

86.3

75.8

57.6

33.6

Harvest
Health
Investment
Life
Investment
Cash On
Hand
Life
Enjoyment
Marginal
ROR
% Invest in
Health

0

79.9

84.3

87.5

89.2

89

86.6

81.2

71.3

54.2

0

68

66.1

63.3

59.1

53.2

44.6

32.3

12.9

0

0

11.9

18.2

24.2

30.1

35.9

42

48.9

58.4

54.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 202.3 289.3 359.7 415.5 456.5 483.1

491.5

475.8

391.1

Interdependent
Period
Investment
Health
End Health
Harvest
Health
Investment
Life Investment
Cash On Hand
Life Enjoyment
Marginal ROR
% Invest in
Health

9.51

8.12

6.93

5.86

4.92

4.02

3.13

2.15

2.05

85

78

72

66

60

52

40

18

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

85
85
0

69
88.9
74

71.9
91.3
77.3

73.3
91.9
79.4

72.9
90.4
80

70.4
86.1
78.6

0
63.9
61.5
58.1
53.2
0
10
15.8
21.4
26.7
0
0
0
0
0
0 173.7 256.5 323.9 376.2
9.99
8.60
7.38
6.31
86

80

73

67

Harvest Rate Per
Health = 0.87
6
7
8

9

65.1
78.1
74.9

56.1
64.7
67.9

41.7
41.7
56.3

17.7
17.7
36.3

46.5
37.2
32.1
37.7
0
0
414 435.5
5.30
4.34

23.6
44.3
0
439
3.33

0
49.6
6.7
398.9
2.47

0
43
0
309
2.47

35

0

0

59

50

